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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5201
This paper adds to aid volatility literature in three 
ways: First it tests the validity of the aid volatility and 
growth relationship from various aspects: across different 
time horizons, by sources of aid, and by aid volatility 
interactions with country characteristics. Second, it 
investigates the relationship by the level of aid absorption 
and spending. Third, when examining the relationship 
between International Development Association 
aid volatility and growth, it isolates International 
Development Association aid volatility due to the 
recipient country’s performance from that due to other 
sources. The findings suggest that, in the long run, on 
average, aid volatility is negatively correlated with real 
economic growth. But the relationship is not even. It is 
stronger for Sub-Saharan African countries than for other 
regions and it is not present in middle-income countries 
This paper—a product of the IDA Resource Mobilization Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
enhance understandings on aid effectiveness. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at syi@worldbank.org.  
or countries with strong institutions. For economies 
where aid is fully absorbed, aid volatility matters for long-
run growth; economies with full aid spending also bear 
a negative impact of aid volatility on long-run growth. 
Where aid is not fully absorbed, or where it is not fully 
spent, the aid volatility relationship is not significant. 
Looking at International Development Association 
aid separately, the volatility arising from the recipient 
country’s International Development Association 
performance does not have a causal relationship with 
growth. In policy terms, the results suggest that low- 
income countries with weak institutions, especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, could benefit from reduced aid 
volatility or from being better prepared for the volatility 
that is there.  
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What Are the Links between Aid Volatility and Growth? 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Aid volatility is a factor of interest, not only because of its effects on economic growth, but in 
its own right. Large fluctuations in aid inflows can result in instability of employment, 
changes in government budgets and uncertainty about the degree to which resources will be 
utilized in the future. All this has welfare consequences.  Hence it is important to understand 
what (if any) are the costs of such volatility. 
 
Aid can be very volatile; it is generally more volatile than many other capital flows or 
government tax receipts.  Bulir and Hamann (2003) find that aid inflows are more volatile 
than domestic revenues, corroborated by their subsequent study (2008b) as well as Hudson 
and Mosley (2006).  In the similar vein, Pallage and Robe (2001) find that aid is twice as 
volatile as real output. Whether or not such aid flows are pro- or anti- cyclical, however, 
remains controversial: Bulir and Hamann (2003) find that aid tends to move in the same 
direction as GDP and revenues, while Pallage and Robe (2001) show that for African 




The causes of aid volatility vary. IMF (2005) finds that aid can be volatile for good reasons, 
e.g. when responding to exogenous shocks, such as terms of trade or natural disasters. This is 
especially the case for low-income countries that are disproportionately prone to exogenous 
shocks. For example, aid inflows sharply increased to Mozambique in response to floods in 
early 2000 and to Ethiopia in response to drought in 2002. Volatility may also reflect a 
recipient country’s political status as well as its governance and macroeconomic 
performance, which are to some extent endogenous to the recipient country’s actions (see 
Appendix I). Here the consequences are less obviously positive. Finally volatility can also be 
a manifestation of budget cycles in donor economies, which is clearly not desirable from the 
recipients’ perspective.   
 
Recently studies have shed light on the macroeconomic impact of aid volatility but the views 
diverge. Arellano et al (2005) suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in aid volatility 
is associated with a decrease in manufactured good exports by up to four percentage points. 
Celasun and Walliser (2005) find that unpredicted aid volatility may result in permanent costs 
in terms of lost output. IMF (2003) and Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), on the other hand, 
assert that aid influxes in response to exogenous shocks help cushion some of the adverse 
impact of the shocks. Prati and Tressel (2006) find that the impact of aid on exports varies by 
country circumstances. Aid flows during periods of adverse shocks or of reconstruction 
efforts subsequent to adverse shocks could have positive effects on exports. Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000) find that, controlling for aid instability, aid itself has positive impact on 
growth. Hudson and Mosley (2008a) show that aid volatility reduces investment and 
government expenditure shares. Theoretically, Agenor and Aizenman (2007) develop a 
model which shows that high aid volatility can induce poverty traps and potentially aggravate 
the effects of macroeconomic shocks. 
 
The paper adds to the literature on aid volatility in three ways. First, it tests the validity of the 
aid volatility and growth relationship. We examine the robustness of the relationship from 
various aspects: across time horizons (1960 through 2000 as well as 1990 through 2000), 
                                                 
1 See Appendix I and Bulir & Hamann (2003, 2005) and Markandya, Ponczek and Yi (2006)   3 
sources of aid (The World Bank IDA - International Development Association, multilateral 
excluding IDA, and bilateral)
 2
 
, and aid volatility interactions with country characteristics.  
Second, the paper investigates if the impact of aid volatility varies by recipient countries’ 
monetary and fiscal policy decisions (aid absorption and aid spending). This is in recognition 
of findings that aid recipient countries can contain the presence of Dutch disease effects of 
aid by adjusting macroeconomic policies. Prati and Tressel (2006) find that “recipient 
countries can smooth aid-driven fluctuations of the trade balance and support export levels by 
adjusting the net domestic assets of the central bank.” IMF (2005) notes, “where aid itself is 
highly volatile, some savings of aid in the form of reserve accumulation may be optimal,” 
(see also Bevan, 2005). Eifert and Gelb (2005) deem a foreign exchange reserve buffer 
equivalent to about 5 months of imports of most low income countries (LICs) adequate for 




Third, the paper looks at the impact of IDA volatility on growth. When examining the 
relationship, we isolate IDA volatility driven by an IDA recipient country’s performance 
from that arising from other sources. This is an attempt to dig deeper into the question of 
what types of aid volatility are generally bad. Some IDA donors at donors’ meetings in the 
past stressed that aid volatility that is endogenous to the recipient country’s socioeconomic 
performance is necessary and may even be desirable.  
 
Our findings are as follows. In the long run, aid volatility is on average negatively correlated 
with economic growth. But this general statement masks a number of qualifications that are 
even more important.  First the relationship is not equally important across all countries: it is 
notably stronger in the Sub-Saharan African countries than other regions.  Second, when 
looking at the medium run the relationship is not as clearly negative. Third, when aid 
volatility is categorized by source of aid the relationship holds for multilateral aid but not for 
bilateral aid.  Fourth the long run adverse impact of aid volatility on growth is not significant 
either for all countries with strong policies and institutions or for middle-income countries. 
 
The impact of aid volatility on growth can vary depending on the level of aid absorption and 
spending. For economies where aid is fully absorbed, aid volatility matters for long-run 
growth.  On the other hand, for those economies with low absorption of aid, the relationship 
matters not only in the long run but also in the medium run. In economies with full aid 
spending, aid volatility appears to lead to a negative impact on long run growth, while in 
those with low spending, the relationship is negligible.  
 
In terms of IDA’s aid, the volatility arising from the recipient country’s IDA performance 
does not have a negative causal relationship with economic growth. However, we find that 
the volatility from other sources can bear negatively on real economic growth in IDA 
member countries in the medium term. The long run impact is not investigated due to the lack 
of data availability.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II spells out the methodology employed; Section 
III reports the basic results; Section IV investigates variation of aid volatility impact on 
growth by aid absorption or spending; Section V explores the relationship between volatility 
                                                 
2 Fieldings and Mavrotas (2008) show the importance of disaggregating aid when modeling the volatility of aid 
inflows. 
3 See Eifert and Gelb (2005) for further discussion on a mechanism for managing exogenous volatility of aid 
flows (i.e. volatility not linked to performance).    4 
and aid as provided through IDA; Section VI revisits the aid volatility-growth nexus using 
two-stage least squares with the two-step efficient generalized method of moments; and 
Section VII concludes.  
 
 
II.  Empirical Methodology 
 
Our analysis follows growth literature in the choice of the dependent and explanatory 
variables adding an aid volatility measure. To evaluate the link between aid volatility and 
economic growth over the period 1960-2000, we estimate the following equation based on 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors:  
 
i i i i X volatility y ε β β α + + + = 2 1             (1) 
 
where y is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita during the period; volatility is 
standard deviation of the  aid-to-GDP ratio for the given period; X is a set of control 
variables; and i is the country index.  
 
We use data for 95 developing countries over the 1960-2000 period. All variables are 
averaged over the five time horizons: the 1960-2000, the 1960-1980, the 1970-2000, the 
1980-2000, and the 1990-2000 periods. A la Rajan and Subramanian (2005), such time 
specifications are to cover the long run (30 to 40-year horizons) as well as the medium terms 
(10 and 20-year) and to grasp a sense of the impact of aid volatility over time.  
 
The control variables we include are as follows:  
 
•  Initial real GDP per capita to control for convergence process (Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Bosworth and Collins, 2003; and Hnatovska and Loayza, 2004); 
•  Gross capital formation as a share of GDP to capture capital accumulation, including 
capital accumulated from aid inflows (Barro and Sala-i-Matin, 1995)
4
•  Inflation rate (annual % change of consumer prices) to measure the effect of 
macroeconomic policies (Bosworth and Collins, 2003);  
; 
•  Initial period life expectancy at birth to measure initial health conditions (Bosworth 
and Collins, 2003); 
•  Average growth, and volatility, of terms of trade to capture external shocks (Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2005); 
•  Quality of trade policies (Sachs and Warner index updated by Wacziarg and Welch, 
2003); 
•  Major political instability (measured by the number of revolutions) to control 
variability of growth as well as aid inflows (World Bank, 2004)
5
                                                 
4 Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in 
the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks 
of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in 
progress." (WDI, 2006). 
; and   
5  We do not control geography, as the channels through which geography relates to growth are part of on-going 
debate. For instance, Easterly and Levine (2003) find evidence that geography impacts on growth only through 
institutions, while Gallup et al (1999) show that geography significantly influences growth in GDP per capita 
from 1965 to 1990.   5 
•  Regional dummies – Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia Pacific.  
 
 
We estimate the relationship based on cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), we drop outliers in all our cross-section 




 Estimates with an exclusion of outliers are justified on the grounds that 
such outliers bias cross-country regressions (Easterly, 2004).  
Using OLS estimations, we look further into the aid volatility and growth relationship by type 
of donor. We broadly categorize donors into three: IDA (the World Bank’s concessional 
window), multilateral donors excluding IDA (ML), and bilateral donors (BL). The regression 
model is the same as equation (1) but the volatility variable is replaced by standard deviation 
of the IDA-to-GDP, the ML-to-GDP or the BL-to-GDP ratio over the five time horizons.  
 
We then extend our regression analysis to categorical interactions between aid volatility and 
country characteristics in growth regressions. The objective is to examine if the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the aid volatility and growth relationship varies by such 
characteristics as income and institutions. The regression model is  
 
i i i i i i X stics characteri volatility volatility y ε β β β α + + ∗ + + = 3 2 1     (2) 
 
where characteristics are income and institutional development. We group countries by the 
cross-country ranking for each characteristic: low, medium, and high.  
 
The paper further expands the categorical interactions to the level of macroeconomic policy 
decisions in aid recipient countries, namely to the full or the low level of aid absorption and 
aid spending. Section IV discusses how we approximate the level of aid absorption and 
spending in an economy and shows how the impact of aid volatility on growth differs by 
macroeconomic policy condition.  
 
We then further drill down on IDA volatility as IDA is a major aid provider to many low-
income countries. We examine how IDA’s volatility related to performance (“good 
volatility”) relates to growth. Section V lays out the methodology and presents results.  
 
Finally we attempt to take into account the possibility that volatility could be endogenous to 




 The IV procedure is to isolate exogenous changes in aid volatility and 
therefore gauge their causal impact on growth of real GDP per capita. The GMM makes it 
that variables measured with error tend to have bias toward zero (Wooldridge, 2001). The 
regression equation is 
i i i




ε β β α
+ =
+ + + = 2 1             (3) 
 
                                                 
6 The Hadi procedure “measures the distance of data points from the main body of data and then iteratively 
reduces the sample to exclude distant data points” (Easterly et al, 2004, p. 2). 
7 Furthermore, we would like to note that we do not conduct a pooled GMM regression exercise because of a 
limited sample size. As Hayashi (2000) highlights, efficient GMM requires a very large sample size.    6 
IV refers to a set of instrumental variables for aid volatility. The choice of instrumental 
variables is based on aid literature: the standard deviation of institution quality to capture 
changes in aid allocations and the standard deviation of terms of trade to capture shocks as 
well as the average of the investment-to-GDP ratio as in Arellano et al. (2005). The level of 
institutional quality is proxied by indexes of the International Country Risk Guide: a 
country’s rating is the sum of five ratings – (i) Government stability, (ii) Investment profile, 
(iii) Corruption, (iv) Law and order, and (v) Bureaucracy quality. Given the ratings are 
already weighted, we do not normalize the ratings.  The higher the rating total the better the 
institutional quality. The maximum point is 40.  
  
III.  Aid Volatility and Growth: OLS Estimation  
 
In this section, we look into the cross-country evidence on the aid volatility and growth 
relationship. We investigate whether the relationship varies across time horizons, sources of 




1. Basic results  
 
Aid volatility tends to be higher in the long run than in the medium run. As Appendix Table 
A.1 shows the standard deviation of the aid-to-GDP ratio is about 4.3 during 1960-2000 and 
1970-2000 periods. In the medium term, it is 3.7 in 1980-2000 period, and as low as 1.7 
during the 1960-1980 period.  
 
The OLS regression results in Table 1A and B indicate that aid volatility is negatively and 
statistically significantly associated with the real GDP per capita growth in 1960-2000, 1970-
2000 and 1980-2000 time horizons.  The partial correlation between aid and volatility is 
given in Figure 1.  A substantial fraction of the variation in growth is explained by our core 
specifications, with R-squared greater in longer time horizons (71 and 67 percent respectively 
in 1960-2000 and 1970-2000 periods). The coefficient on the aid volatility is negative in all 





Table 1A: Aid volatility and average real GDP per capita growth in the long run: OLS estimation  
   1960-2000  1960-2000  1960-2000  1970-2000  1970-2000  1970-2000 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Aid volatility   -0.101  -0.11  -0.085  -0.086  -0.095  -0.072 
  (4.00)***  (4.48)**  (3.19)**  (2.64)**  (2.90)**  (1.95) 
Initial GDP per capita  -1.045  -0.979  -1.083  -1.425  -1.353  -1.453 
  (6.11)***  (5.26)**  (6.43)**  (6.95)***  (6.34)**  (6.74)** 
Gross capital formation  0.136  0.136  0.119  0.123  0.119  0.105 
  (7.44)***  (7.90)**  (6.09)**  (5.89)***  (6.26)**  (4.36)** 
Inflation (percent)    -0.002      -0.002   
    (1.72)      (2.09)*   
Initial life expectancy  0.057  0.052  0.042  0.081  0.079  0.054 
  (4.57)***  (3.64)**  (3.08)**  (4.83)***  (4.44)**  (2.84)** 
Average growth of terms of trade  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.024  0.024  0.024 
  (1.81)*  (1.84)  (1.93)  (2.27)**  (2.31)*  (2.31)* 
                                                 
8 When retaining outliers in our sample, the coefficient of aid volatility is statistically significant only for the 
1960-2000 time horizon (results are provided at request).    7 
Standard deviation of growth of terms of trade  -0.017  -0.018  -0.015  -0.034  -0.034  -0.032 
  (2.16)**  (2.21)*  (2.00)*  (2.98)***  (2.99)**  (2.65)** 
Trade policy  1.804  1.751  1.623  2.204  2.061  2.129 
  (4.19)***  (4.27)**  (3.77)**  (4.46)***  (4.39)**  (4.06)** 
Number of revolutions  -0.769  -0.202  -1.093  -0.532  -0.017  -0.944 
  (1.59)  (0.37)  (2.25)*  (1.22)  (0.03)  (2.20)* 
Sub-Saharan Africa      -0.727      -0.99 
      (2.69)**      (2.48)* 
East Asia Pacific      0.206      0.112 
      (0.77)      (0.34) 
Constant  2.658  2.415  4.309  2.951  2.609  5.319 
  (1.71)*  (1.61)  (2.95)**  (1.63)  (1.60)  (2.75)** 
Observations  78  75  78  82  78  82 
R-squared  0.71  0.74  0.74  0.67  0.7  0.7 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation. Figures in 

















The inflation rate, a macroeconomic policy variable, enters marginal in explaining growth – 
coefficient of -0.002 ~3 across different time horizons (Table 1A column (2) and (5) and 
Table 1b column (2), (5) and (8)). After controlling for regional effects using dummy 
variables, aid volatility enters significantly only for periods 1960-2000 and 1970-2000.  The 
results show that aid volatility matters for real growth in the Sub-Saharan Africa region but 
not in the East-Asia Pacific region (Table 1A column (3) and (6) and Table 1B column (3), 
(6), and (9)).   
 
How important is aid volatility in determining real economic growth in our regressions? As in 
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Aid volatility
coef = -.10113685, (robust) se = .02527919, t = -4  8 
of the coefficient of the aid volatility variable and its standard deviation above and below the 
mean. Table 2 displays that an increase of aid volatility by one standard deviation is 
estimated to reduce the real GDP growth rate as much as nearly two percentage points in the 
medium and the long run: if the 1960-2000 aid-to-GDP ratio is one standard deviation above 
its mean, the real GDP per capita growth rate is associated with a decrease by 2.12 percentage 
points.  
 
Table 2. How important is aid volatility in real GDP per capita growth? 
  
Change in real per capita GDP growth for a one SD 
increase in volatility 
Period  Lower bound  Upper bound 
1960-2000  -0.01  -2.12 
1960-1980  0.00  -0.38 
1970-2000  0.00  -1.80 
1980-2000  0.00  -2.01 
1990-2000  0.00  0.42 
     
Sub-Saharan 
Africa     
1960-2000  0.00  2.14 
 Table 1B: Aid volatility and average real GDP per capita growth in the medium run: OLS estimation  
   1960-1980  1960-1980  1960-1980  1980-2000  1980-2000  1980-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Aid volatility   -0.065  -0.003  -0.058  -0.1  -0.111  -0.084  0.03  0.007  0.04 
  (0.98)  (0.03)  (0.83)  (2.03)**  (2.23)*  (1.62)  (0.46)  (0.11)  (0.66) 
Initial GDP per capita  -1.216  -1.213  -1.217  -1.188  -1.237  -1.196  -0.814  -0.992  -0.704 
  (3.38)***  (2.42)*  (3.26)**  (3.25)***  (3.68)**  (3.26)**  (1.41)  (2.09)*  (1.23) 
Gross capital formation  0.137  0.138  0.135  0.132  0.123  0.117  0.155  0.131  0.136 
  (4.60)***  (3.82)**  (4.03)**  (5.54)***  (5.60)**  (4.61)**  (3.58)***  (2.99)**  (3.89)** 
Inflation (percent)    0.002      -0.002      -0.003   
    (0.21)      (3.07)**      (5.60)**   
Initial life expectancy  0.092  0.08  0.079  0.076  0.081  0.052  0.05  0.068  -0.013 
  (3.47)***  (2.78)**  (2.69)**  (3.12)***  (3.12)**  (1.63)  (1.08)  (1.64)  (0.23) 
Average growth of terms of trade  0.009  0.012  0.009  0.01  0.014  0.011  0.012  -0.001  0.013 
  (1.61)  (2.16)*  (1.63)  (0.61)  (0.77)  (0.68)  (0.30)  (0.04)  (0.33) 
Standard deviation of growth of terms of trade  -0.017  -0.007  -0.015  -0.02  -0.024  -0.019  -0.157  -0.155  -0.159 
  (1.74)*  (0.94)  (1.41)  (0.98)  (1.13)  (0.92)  (4.23)***  (4.17)**  (4.42)** 
Trade policy  1.679  1.803  1.543  1.554  1.412  1.566  1.24  0.733  1.276 
  (2.15)**  (2.18)*  (2.09)*  (2.69)***  (2.47)*  (2.69)**  (1.75)*  (1.21)  (1.86) 
Number of revolutions  -0.194  -0.394  -0.28  -0.245  0.08  -0.604  -1.105  -0.413  -1.475 
  (0.20)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (0.45)  (0.13)  (1.06)  (2.00)**  (0.76)  (2.32)* 
Sub-Saharan Africa      -0.46      -0.791      -1.453 
      (1.12)      (1.26)      (1.99)* 
East Asia Pacific      0.125      0.265      0.938 
      (0.27)      (0.66)      (1.58) 
Constant  3.304  3.304  4.115  1.893  2.051  3.857  0.56  3.148  4.36 
  (1.51)  (1.16)  (1.74)  (0.70)  (0.79)  (1.27)  (0.13)  (0.81)  (0.99) 
Observations  65  52  65  86  82  86  95  91  95 
R-squared  0.52  0.53  0.54  0.49  0.55  0.51  0.5  0.59  0.53 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** 
significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level.  As Appendix Table A.1 shows, a one standard deviation increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio would 
be a lot – representing anything from a quarter to a third of the inter-period volatility.  In this 
context the magnitude of the impact is relatively modest – a one percent increase in aid volatility, 
for example would cause a 0.02-0.03 percent decrease in economic growth. 
 
2. Sources of aid  
 
In the spirit of Clemens et al (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005), we distinguish the 
impact of different sources of aid volatility. We disaggregate aid by type of donor: IDA, 
multilateral excluding IDA, and bilateral. The reason behind separating IDA from other 
multilateral aid is that in some countries IDA is a major aid provider. Table A1 provides the 
summary statistics of aid by source. Bilateral aid is most volatile across different time horizons, 
while multilateral aid (excluding IDA) tends to be least volatile. IDA is least volatile only during 
the 1960-1980 period.  
 
As for the volatility-growth link, we indeed find that multilateral aid volatility, including IDA, is 
negatively associated with both medium and long run economic growth, especially the 1960-
2000 horizon, while bilateral aid volatility is significant only in the 1980-2000 period at the 5 
percent level (Tables 3A-C).  Various arguments can be made as to why some categories but not 
others should affect long-run growth. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) notes that multilateral aid is 
less explicitly “political” than bilateral aid and should therefore have a different impact.  
 
3. Interactions with country characteristics 
 




, we allow non-monotonic effects through categorical interactions. The reasoning is 
that the continuous interactions may impose a monotonically invalid relationship between the aid 
volatility-growth link and a given characteristic.  
Categorical interaction effects are measured through the coefficient on the multiplicative term 
between aid volatility and the binary variable that indicates each country’s grouping. Country 
characteristics of income as well as institutional quality are considered. For each characteristic, 
the sample is divided into three groups: low, medium and high. The groupings of income are as 
defined in Global Development Finance (2005): low refers to low income countries in the 
sample, medium to lower middle income countries, and high to upper middle income countries. 
The categories of institutional quality are derived from the cross-country ranking: weak 
corresponds to the 25
th percentile, strong to the 75 percentile of the institution index. The index 
is a measure of institutional quality used in Bosworth and Collins (2003).  
 
In terms of the level of income, aid volatility has a negative impact on long-run growth only in 
poor countries (Table 4 column 1). The coefficients of aid volatility for both middle and high-
income category countries are negative but not different from zero. Hence it appears that for 
lower and upper middle income countries, the results negate the causal relationship between aid 
volatility and long-run growth. An explanation for these results could be that, as countries 
                                                 
9 See the correlation matrix of characteristics in Table A2 in Appendix II.   11 
develop, they have policies and means in place to neutralize the long-run effects of aid volatility 
on economic growth, a result also found in growth volatility literature (Fatás, 2002). 
 
Regarding institutional quality (Table 4 column 2), our findings negate a significant relationship 
between aid volatility and growth for countries with strong institutions. The negative relationship 
between the two holds for countries with weak or medium quality of institutions. As explained 
above, it is likely that the higher the quality of institutions, the better volatility cushioning 
mechanisms are in place, reducing the long-run impact on economic development. 
 












IDA-to-GDP volatility   -0.798  -0.882  -0.757  -0.751  -0.269 
  (-5.14)  (-0.700)  (-2.910)  (-2.240)  (-0.380) 
  ***    ***  **   
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.587  -0.426  -0.868  -0.857  -1.192 
  (-2.33)  (-0.97)  (-2.14)  (-1.33)  (-1.16) 
  **    **     
East Asia  0.048  -0.183  0.040  0.057  0.398 
  (0.17)  (-0.44)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.78) 
           
Number of observations  76  61  79  83  88 
Adjusted R-squared  0.78  0.47  0.72  0.50  0.45 
   









2000  1990-2000 
Multilateral aid volatility (excluding IDA)  -0.546  -0.351  -0.462  -0.563  -0.154 
  (-3.64)  (-2.100)  (-2.090)  (-1.630)  (-0.270) 
  ***  **  **     
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.877  -0.666  -1.144  -1.030  -1.269 
  (-3.04)  (-1.38)  (-2.77)  (-1.59)  (-1.4) 
  ***    ***     
East Asia  0.132  -0.054  0.017  0.124  0.410 
  (0.49)  (-0.13)  (0.05)  (0.32)  (0.78) 
           
Number of observations  76  56  79  83  88 
Adjusted R-squared  0.74  0.49  0.68  0.49  0.45 
   
Table 3C. Bilateral aid volatility and real GDP per capita growth  
   1960-2000  1960-1980  1970-2000  1980-2000  1990-2000 
Bilateral aid volatility  -0.164  -0.194  -0.168  -0.245  -0.144 
  (-1.95)  (-1.150)  (-1.520)  (-2.120)  (-0.950) 
  *      **   
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.959  -0.644  -1.203  -1.146  -1.285 
  (-3.28)  (-1.33)  (-2.93)  (-1.79)  (-1.46) 
  ***    ***  *   
East Asia  0.270  -0.036  0.031  0.093  0.399 
  (0.9)  (-0.08)  (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.76) 
           
Number of observations  75  59  79  83  88 
Adjusted R-squared  0.71  0.49  0.68  0.50  0.45 





Table 4. Aid volatility and average real GDP per capita growth: Categorical interaction, 1960-
2000 
  Income (1)   Institutional 
quality (2) 
(a) Aid volatility, low category  -0.095  -0.091 
  (-2.810)***  (-2.310)** 
(b) Aid volatility, middle category  -0.041  -0.083 
  (-0.620)  (-2.270)** 
(c) Aid volatility, high category  -0.046  -0.059 
  (-0.76)  (-1.250) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.514  -0.566 
  (-1.75)*  (-1.920)* 
East Asia  0.367  0.285 
  (1.15)  (0.860) 
Number of observations  81  81 
R-squared  0.7922  0.7873 
     
Test (p-values)     
H0: Coefficient for the (a) variable = coefficient of the (b) variable  0.0204  0.0361 
H0: Coefficient for the (a) variable = coefficient of the (c) variable  0.0179  0.0439 
   
Note for Table 3-4: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of 
the traditional calculation. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** 
significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
IV.  Aid Absorption or Spending and Growth 
 
In this section we examine the aid volatility-growth link interacted with categories of 
macroeconomic management of aid inflows: low absorption of aid inflows; high absorption; low 
aid spending; and high aid spending. This is to account for the macroeconomic impact of aid 
volatility depending on the policy responses to aid, especially the interaction of fiscal policy with 
monetary and exchange rate policy (IMF, 2005).  
 
Monetary and fiscal policy responses to aid volatility can cause unplanned outcomes of such 
volatility.  For instance Dutch disease can make an impact on long-run growth where the source 
of growth is the export sector. The transmission channel is thus: a temporary surge of aid inflows 
causes real exchange rate appreciation and therefore reallocate resources away from tradable 
sectors.  Prati and Tressel (2006) find evidence for the presence of Dutch disease effects of aid in 
certain conditions.  
 
Following Aiyar et al (2005) and IMF (2005), absorption is defined as the extent to which the 
non-aid current account deficit widens in response to an increase in aid inflows, i.e.  
 
Absorption  = ∆ non-aid current account deficit/ ∆ aid. 
   13 
This measures to what extent “aid engenders a real transfer of resources through higher imports, 
or through a reduction in the domestic resources devoted to producing exports. Absorption 
depends on both exchange rate policy and on policies that influence the demand for imports. The 
central bank controls the exchange rate through its sales of foreign exchange, while monetary 
policy can be used to control aggregate demand and the demand for imports” (Aiyar et al 2005, 
pp. 28-29).  
 
Spending is defined as the widening in the government fiscal deficit net of aid that accompanies 
an increment in aid:  
 
Spending = ∆ (G-T)/ ∆ aid 
 
where G is government expenditures and T is taxation. Spending captures “the extent to which 
the government uses aid to finance its increases in expenditures or a reduction in taxation. Even 
if the aid comes tied to particular expenditures, governments can choose whether or not to 
increase the overall fiscal deficit as aid increases. Analyzing spending is important because of 
the natural focus on the budget as a policy variable, and also because of the importance of 
tensions between the fiscal policy response to aid and broader macroeconomic objectives with 
respect to the exchange rare and inflation” (IMF 2005 p.10). IMF (2005) recognizes that these 
definitions of absorption and spending take into account the fungibility of aid.  
 
Categories are determined by each country’s absorption/spending ratios.  A low level of 
absorption or spending refers to cases where the ratio is below 20 percent while a high level 
refers to cases where the ratio is above 80 percent.                                                                                                
 
The results are intuitive. As for aid absorption (Table 5), there is a statistically significant long-
run link between aid volatility and growth in economies where aid inflows are highly absorbed 
(the 1960-2000 time horizon). On the other hand, the medium to short -term link is statistically 
significant in economies where aid inflows have low absorption (1990-2000 period). The 
coefficient test results indicate that the coefficients of aid volatility with aid highly absorbed are 
significantly different from those of aid volatility with aid at a low level of absorption for these 
two time horizons.  
 












Aid volatility, aid not fully absorbed  -0.066  -0.003  -0.078  -0.084  -0.378 
  (-1.9)  (-0.020)  (-1.810)  (-1.320)  (-3.520) 
  *    *    *** 
Aid volatility, aid highly absorbed  -0.090  -0.055  -0.075  -0.080  0.011 
  (-3.02)  (-0.770)  (-1.720)  (-1.410)  (0.180) 
  ***    *     
Number of observations  81  64  85  86  95 
Adjusted R-squared  0.7875  0.6152  0.74  0.56  0.57 
           
Test (p-values)           
H0: Volatility coefficient for "aid not absorbed" 
= volatility coefficient for "aid fully absorbed"  0.0115  0.7330  0.1244  0.265  0.0019   14 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional 
calculation. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
  
When aid spending is considered as a country’s macroeconomic management of aid inflows 
(Table 6), the aid volatility-growth link is significant only for the country group with high 
spending: the volatility coefficient is significantly negative at the 1 percent significance level for 
the 1960-2000 and the 1970-2000 horizons and at the 10 percent level for the 1980-2000 time 
horizon. High spending means that the government increases expenditures in response to aid 
inflows. Hence a likely interpretation of these results is that countries with high aid spending 
would have fluctuations in spending and thereby would have implications on output. 
 












Aid volatility, aid not spent  -0.074  0.041  -0.065  -0.045  0.001 
  (-1.53)  (0.44)  (-1)  (-0.68)  (0.01) 
           
Aid volatility, aid fully spent  -0.089  -0.074  -0.090  -0.097  -0.001 
  (-3.47)  (-1.14)  (-3.45)  (-1.92)  (-0.02) 
  ***    ***  *   
Number of observations  78  63  82  86  95 
Adjusted R-squared  0.69  0.5506  0.66  0.48  0.50 
           
Test (p-values)           
H0: Volatility coefficient for "aid not spent" = 
volatility coefficient for "aid fully spent"  0.0038  0.3775  0.0041  0.1616  0.9996 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional 
calculation. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level; and * significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
V.  IDA Aid Volatility and Growth 
 
How does IDA aid volatility affect growth? IDA allocations are based on a country’s 
performance, measured by a rating of policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) together with a 
rating provided in the annual report on portfolio performance and a weight of the governance 
factor in the CPIA
10
 
. Performance-based IDA allocation has its justification in the theory of aid 
absorption: a country with a better quality of institution and policy better utilizes aid for 
economic growth than others. That is, IDA aid variations are largely endogenous to a recipient 
country’s performance. In the system, however, there are some external events that weaken the 
performance-based IDA allocation system – such as addressing a post-conflict situations, natural 
disasters and hikes in oil prices.  
                                                 
10 The formulae used in the IDA allocation are as follows: IDA allocation=f(IDA Performance
2, GNI per capita
-.125, 
Population). IDA performance=(.8CPIA*.2ARPP)+governance factor.   15 
In this section, we isolate IDA aid volatility due to variations in IDA performance from that 
arising from other noises. The isolation procedure is as follows: we regress IDA performance 
rating with respect to IDA aid volatility by country for the 1980-2000 period. The standard 
deviation of error terms resulting from the estimation captures the volatility of noises (or 
exogenous factors for an IDA allocation). This short period is due to the limited availability of 
IDA performance ratings.  
 
                    (4) 
 
where IDA aid volatility for country i is a quadratic function of IDA performance and others. A 
volatility of IDA performance for a country is the standard deviation of its performance during 
1980-2000 and during 1990-2000.  
 
This exercise offers us now two variables that approximate sources of IDA aid volatility: one is 
volatility due to IDA performance and the other is volatility due to other exogenous sources. 
Having these two volatility variables, we then test the association of these two types of volatility 
with economic growth, using OLS regressions. All growth control variables in equation (1) are 
the controls as well in equation (5). 
 
i i i i i X exogenous IDA e performanc IDA y ε γ β β α + + + + = _ _ 2 1           (5)  
 
where IDA performance is the standard deviation of IDA performance by country and 
IDA_exogenous is the standard deviation of error terms of equation (4).  
 
The results displayed in Table 7 indicate that the negative link between IDA volatility and 
growth holds only with IDA aid volatility originating in exogenous factors. The link is 
significant at the 1 percent significance level for both the 1980-2000 and the 1990-2000 time 
horizons. The coefficients of the IDA performance volatility are negative but are not statistically 
different from zero. The results suggest an economically meaningful impact of IDA. A one 
standard deviation of IDA’s exogenous volatility is associated with about 2 percent lower GDP 
per capita growth. This becomes even larger for the Sub-Saharan Africa region: nearly 4 percent 
for the 1980-2000 period.  
 
Table 7. IDA performance volatility and real GDP per capita growth  
   1980-2000  1990-2000 
IDA performance volatility  -0.154  -0.194 
  (-0.08)  (-1.150) 
     
IDA exogenous volatility  -1.809  -1.222 
  (-2.63)***  (-3.000)*** 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.935  -0.644 
  (-2.24)**  (-1.33) 
East Asia  -0.268  -0.036 
  (-0.38)  (-0.08) 
Number of observations  48  59 
Adjusted R-squared  0.53  0.49 
i i i e e performanc IDA IDA + + =
2 ) _ ( β α  16 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional 
calculation. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level; and * significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
VI.  Aid Volatility and Growth: IV estimation with GMM  
 
Noting the limitations of the use of OLS regressions, such as measurement or endogeneity 
problems as well as problems of unobservable heterogeneity or omitted variables, we conduct IV 
estimation with generalized method of moments (GMM). We use the following three instruments 
for aid volatility: the standard deviation of institution quality and the standard deviation of terms 
of trade to capture shocks as well as, like in Arellano et al. (2005), the average of the investment-
to-GDP ratio. The exclusion restrictions are that the instruments are orthogonal to  i ε in equation 
(3). Under these assumptions, the parameters of interest are consistently estimated. Table 8 
depicts the regression results. 
 
 
Table 8: Aid volatility and average real GDP per capita growth: GMM estimation  
   1960-2000  1960-2000  1960-2000  1970-2000  1970-2000  1970-2000 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Aid volatility   -0.092  -0.142  -0.007  -0.305  -0.472  -0.402 
  (0.140)  (0.127)  (0.171)  (0.295)  (0.389)  (0.436) 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.990***  -0.971***  -0.922***  -1.687***  -1.788***  -1.902** 
  (0.223)  (0.194)  (0.285)  (0.455)  (0.558)  (0.756) 
Gross capital formation  0.135***  0.127***  0.103***  0.116**  0.093**  0.117** 
  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.058) 
Inflation (percent)  0.056**  0.045*  0.034  0.050  0.025  -0.000 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.053) 
Initial life expectancy  0.006  0.008  0.004  0.016  0.024  0.020 
  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
Average growth of terms of trade  1.955***  1.984***  1.200  2.691***  3.012*  3.082 
  (0.517)  (0.508)  (0.834)  (1.001)  (1.582)  (1.887) 
Standard deviation of growth of terms of trade  -0.686  -0.072  -1.423**  -0.261  0.470  -0.359 
  (0.557)  (0.601)  (0.706)  (0.688)  (1.068)  (1.280) 
Trade policy    -0.002*      -0.003**   
    (0.001)      (0.001)   
Number of revolutions      -1.239**      -1.084 
      (0.516)      (0.879) 
Sub-Saharan Africa      0.413      -0.875 
      (0.570)      (1.504) 
East Asia Pacific  2.560  2.974  4.505**  7.305  9.441  11.872* 
  (2.289)  (1.809)  (2.128)  (5.675)  (6.825)  (7.021) 
Constant  2.658  2.415  4.309  2.951  2.609  5.319 
  (1.71)*  -1.61  (2.95)**  -1.63  -1.6  (2.75)** 
Observations  78  75  78  82  78  82 
R-squared  0.71  0.74  0.74  0.67  0.7  0.7 
Note: All standard errors are robust - Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation.  
Excluded Instruments: the standard deviation of institution quality, the standard deviation of terms of trade to capture shocks, and the average of 
the investment-to-GDP ratio. Figures in parenthesis refer to t-statistics. *** significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level; and * 
significance at the 10% level.    17 
 
Comparing the GMM and OLS results, one can notice that they point to same direction in the 
sense that aid volatility is malefic to growth. Although, the results are not statistically significant, 
the point estimated are not very different from those found in the OLS regressions, especially in 
the 1960-2000 sample. Since GMM estimators are less efficient than the OLS ones under the 
assumption of exogeneity of the regressors, we conclude that indeed there is a negative 
relationship between aid volatility and growth for the entire sample. 
 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
The paper started out to see if there was a negative relationship between aid volatility and long-
run economic growth.   Although we found this negative relationship when looking at the dataset 
as a whole, the results are much more nuanced at a detailed level. The negative link is not present 
for middle income countries or countries with strong institutions. Nor is it present in countries 
where aid is not fully spent.  Looking geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa appears to have a 
stronger negative relationship than other regions.  Finally the link is ambiguous in the medium 
term as opposed to the long term. 
 
In terms of donor groups, volatility in aid from bilateral donors does not seem to have a long run 
relationship with economic growth, while that from multilaterals does.  It is not clear why this 
should be so and the results merit some further research. 
 
On IDA, the findings are consistent: a negative link with long-run growth. The volatility of IDA 
disbursement is partly caused by the recipient country’s performance and partly by other factors. 
The study finds that IDA aid volatility caused by country performance does not have a causal 
relationship with growth while the residual IDA aid volatility does. 
 
In policy terms the results suggest that low- income countries with weak institutions, especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, could benefit from reduced volatility of aid or from being better prepared 
for the volatility that is there.  This could be achieved through the use of models that better 
predict aid flows, by maintaining larger reserves (possibly pooled) and by greater commitment 
by donors to reduce the gap between commitments and disbursements.   
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 Appendix I. How volatile is aid and what causes aid volatility? 
 
Literature suggests that aid is more volatile than other capital inflows, revenue receipts or GDP. 
Osei, Morrissey and Lensink (2002) find that, for low-income countries in aggregate, ODA was 
less volatile than other capital inflows (e.g. foreign direct investment) over the 1970 – 97 period, 
whereas at the individual country level, ODA was much more volatile. For instance, in Indonesia 
the coefficient of variation is 78 percent of the mean aid inflows. Bulir and Hamann (2003) find 
large aid volatility in 72 developing countries, with coefficients of variation in the range of 40-60 
percent of the mean aid flows, larger than that of revenues. Vargas Hill (2005) also suggests that 
variation in aid flows is twice as large as the variation in revenue receipts in Sub-Saharan 
African countries (see Figure 1 below for the time trends). Vargas Hill (2005) further presents 
that the coefficient of variation of net aid disbursements to Sub-Saharan African countries is 21 
percent, five times as high as their GDP with the coefficient of variation of 4 percent. 
 
Figure A.1. Volatility of aid  
   
Source: Vargas Hill (2005)  
 
Interestingly, these figures suggest potential counter-cyclical property in net aid flows to Sub-
Saharan Africa: aid flow trends are opposite to the trends of GDP and revenue receipts. This is in 
contrast to the findings of Bulir and Hamann (2003, 2005): aid tends to move in the same 




As found by Bulir and Hamann (2003), Vargas 
Hill (2005) also finds in a case study of Uganda 
and Zambia over 1993-2000 that failure to meet 
conditionality is a main cause of aid volatility 
(Figure A.2). Uganda experiencing aid 
disbursement problems responded by meeting 
macroeconomic conditions, in contrast to Zambia 
which is experiencing program interruptions as a 
result of failing to do so. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Hudson and Mosley (2008b) argue that Bulir and Hamann´s (2003, 2005) results depend on the dataset they use. 
   
Source: Vargas Hill (2005) 
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Appendix II. Summary statistics 
 
Table A.1. Summary statistics  
Variable  Number of 
observations  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Period   1960-2000  
Aid to GDP  79  3.90  4.28  0.07  20.94 
IDA to GDP  75  0.61  0.74  0.00  3.60 
Multilateral aid to GDP  74  0.41  0.48  0.00  2.44 
Bilateral aid to GDP  74  1.19  1.38  0.00  6.51 
           
Period   1960-1980 
Aid to GDP  63  1.91  1.70  0.00  6.06 
IDA to GDP  61  0.18  0.24  0.00  1.14 
Multilateral aid to GDP  57  0.23  0.30  0.00  1.42 
Bilateral aid to GDP  59  0.96  1.25  0.00  6.92 
           
Period   1970-2000  
Aid to GDP  83  3.66  4.29  0.04  20.94 
IDA to GDP  79  0.62  0.75  0.00  3.60 
Multilateral aid to GDP  78  0.41  0.48  0.00  2.44 
Bilateral aid to GDP  78  1.19  1.36  0.00  6.51 
           
Period   1980-2000  
Aid to GDP  83  3.09  3.66  0.03  20.01 
IDA to GDP  80  0.58  0.73  0.00  2.90 
Multilateral aid to GDP  78  0.33  0.38  0.00  1.85 
Bilateral aid to GDP  73  0.93  1.05  0.00  4.94 
           
Period   1990-2000  
Aid to GDP  80  2.52  2.90  0.02  13.67 
IDA to GDP  78  0.50  0.62  0.00  2.21 
Multilateral aid to GDP  73  0.25  0.30  0.00  1.34 
Bilateral aid to GDP  79  0.68  0.73  0.00  3.36 
 
Table A. 2. Correlation, 1960-2000 
   Variable   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
(1)  Real per capita GDP growth   1                 
(2)  Standard deviation of aid-to-GDP   -0.3776  1               
(3)  Initial GDP per capita  -0.0238  -0.3517  1             
(4)  Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  0.5502  -0.0387  0.2131  1           
(5)  Initial life expectancy  0.4539  -0.4891  0.5877  0.2831  1         
(6)  Average growth of terms of trade  -0.0769  0.2677  -0.1212  0.1124  -0.222  1       
(7)  Standard deviation of growth of terms of trade  -0.1733  0.2158  -0.0658  0.0628  -0.1588  0.7684  1     
(8)  Trade policy  0.4219  -0.2144  0.1789  0.1102  0.3594  -0.2403  -0.2022  1   













spending Income  Outlier
ALB Albania 15.61 0.83 0.09 1.89 Full Full Lower middle
DZA Algeria 1.52 4.64 0.00 0.09 0.48 No Full Lower middle
AGO Angola -1.65 2.75 0.28 0.04 0.28 Africa No Full Lower middle
ARG Argentina 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.07 No No Upper middle
ARM Armenia 5.61 2.21 0.19 0.58 Partial Full Lower middle
AZE Azerbaijan 1.52 0.56 0.04 0.72 No Full Lower middle
BGD Bangladesh 1.16 1.94 0.34 0.37 0.83 Full Full Low
BLZ Belize 3.70 0.00 1.13 1.58 Full Full Upper middle
BEN Benin 0.32 4.36 0.75 0.88 0.98 Africa No Partial Low
BOL Bolivia 0.37 2.92 0.63 0.53 0.73 No Full Lower middle
BWA Botswana 5.29 7.98 0.37 0.28 4.52 Africa No Full Upper middle Outlier
BRA Brazil 2.77 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.08 Full Full Lower middle
BGR Bulgaria 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.58 No No Lower middle
BFA Burkina Faso 0.59 5.47 0.96 0.57 0.50 Africa No Full Low
BDI Burundi -0.06 7.47 1.57 1.05 1.22 Africa Full No Low
CMR Cameroon 0.49 1.70 0.48 0.16 0.88 Africa Full No Low
CPV Cape Verde 3.50 7.74 1.22 1.20 0.70 Africa Full Full Lower middle
CAF Central African Rep. -2.07 4.64 1.23 0.60 1.03 Africa Full Full Low
TCD Chad -0.72 5.61 1.25 0.70 1.28 Africa Full Full Low
CHL Chile 2.37 0.79 0.00 0.04 0.16 Full No Upper middle
CHN China 4.26 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.11 East Asia Full No Lower middle
COL Colombia 1.89 0.74 0.01 0.03 0.33 No Full Lower middle
COM Comoros -0.50 10.10 1.34 2.44 3.19 Africa Full No Low
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. -3.37 1.92 0.61 0.16 0.44 Africa Full Full Low
COG Congo, Rep. 3.25 3.82 1.02 0.27 2.02 Africa Full Full Low
CRI Costa Rica 1.31 1.88 0.00 0.28 0.93 Full No Upper middle
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 0.35 3.32 1.08 0.19 1.03 Africa Full Full Low
HRV Croatia 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.03 Full No Upper middle
CZE Czech Republic 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.04 No Full Upper middle
DOM Dominican Republic 2.84 1.87 0.03 0.24 0.39 No Full Lower middle
ECU Ecuador 1.37 0.50 0.06 0.18 0.29 Full Full Lower middle
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.60 4.84 0.15 1.35 2.88 No No Lower middle
SLV El Salvador 0.73 3.08 0.07 0.43 1.05 No Full Lower middle
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 0.25 18.10 2.42 1.70 3.61 Full Full Upper middle
ETH Ethiopia 0.47 3.97 0.88 0.46 6.51 Africa Full No Low
FJI Fiji 1.75 1.26 0.00 0.08 0.34 East Asia No Full Lower middle
GAB Gabon 2.55 1.94 0.00 0.10 0.78 Africa Full Full Upper middle
GMB Gambia, The 0.75 12.49 1.82 2.00 2.36 Africa No Full Low
GEO Georgia 3.27 1.27 0.02 0.43 Full No Lower middle
GHA Ghana 1.11 3.90 1.56 0.21 0.61 Africa Full No Low
GTM Guatemala 1.28 0.66 0.00 0.14 0.22 No No Lower middle
GIN Guinea 0.07 2.78 0.87 0.31 2.36 Africa Full Full Low
GNB GuineaBissau 1.19 19.72 3.60 3.86 4.66 Africa Full Partial Low
HTI Haiti 2.91 5.27 0.69 0.60 1.77 Full No Low
HND Honduras 0.47 3.57 1.05 0.74 0.72 Full Full Lower middle
HUN Hungary 2.21 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.16 Full No Upper middle
IND India 2.68 0.64 0.12 0.01 0.29 No Full Low
IDN Indonesia 3.40 1.41 0.11 0.03 0.87 East Asia No Full Lower middle
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.10 Full No Lower middle
ISR Israel 2.80 1.87 Full No
JAM Jamaica 0.74 2.32 0.00 0.30 1.80 No Full Lower middle
JOR Jordan 1.33 9.03 0.20 0.44 2.20 Full Partial Lower middle
KAZ Kazakhstan 0.38 0.00 0.04 0.21 Full No Lower middle
KEN Kenya 1.12 3.32 0.97 0.13 0.67 Africa No Full Low
KOR Korea, Rep. 5.91 2.80 East Asia Full No Outlier
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 6.38 1.59 1.86 1.62 No Full Low
LVA Latvia 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.21 Full Full Upper middle
LBN Lebanon 2.12 0.00 0.24 0.28 Full Full Upper middle
LSO Lesotho 2.06 6.86 0.73 1.25 0.86 Africa Full No Low
MKD Macedonia, FYR 2.55 0.39 0.30 0.19 Partial Full Lower middle
MDG Madagascar -0.99 4.89 1.15 0.68 2.81 Africa Full No Low
MWI Malawi 1.57 8.72 1.97 0.88 2.11 Africa Full Full Low
MYS Malaysia 3.86 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.27 East Asia Full No Upper middle
MLI Mali -0.03 5.91 1.01 0.91 1.67 Africa Full Full Low
MRT Mauritania 0.59 11.16 1.45 1.54 4.39 Africa Full Full Low
MUS Mauritius 3.71 1.46 0.02 0.19 0.78 Africa Full No Upper middle
MEX Mexico 1.97 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 Full No Upper middle
MDA Moldova 3.25 1.30 0.01 1.07 No Full Low
MAR Morocco 2.61 1.33 0.04 0.17 1.25 No Full Lower middle
MOZ Mozambique -1.05 20.94 2.52 0.85 4.81 Africa No Full Low
NAM Namibia 0.78 2.24 Africa Full Partial Lower middle
NPL Nepal 1.57 3.90 0.81 0.74 0.33 Full No Low
NIC Nicaragua -1.22 11.86 1.22 1.16 8.93 No No Low
NER Niger -1.55 6.25 1.05 0.50 0.69 Africa No Full Low
NGA Nigeria -0.95 0.42 0.11 0.02 0.14 Africa No Full Low
PAK Pakistan 2.89 2.41 0.20 0.25 1.66 Full No Low
PAN Panama 2.40 0.97 0.00 0.29 0.30 No Full Upper middle
PNG Papua New Guinea 0.75 5.68 0.22 0.67 0.57 East Asia Full Partial Low
PRY Paraguay 1.65 0.88 0.09 0.20 0.71 Full No Lower middle
PER Peru 0.88 0.56 0.00 0.05 0.59 No Full Lower middle
PHL Philippines 1.33 0.74 0.02 0.07 0.51 East Asia No Full Lower middle
POL Poland 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.04 Full No Upper middle
ROM Romania 3.54 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.21 No No Lower middle
RUS Russian Federation 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.06 Full Full Upper middle
RWA Rwanda -0.12 15.24 0.91 0.47 0.60 Africa Full No Low
SEN Senegal -0.28 4.53 0.76 0.66 1.46 Africa Full Full Low
SLE Sierra Leone -0.43 8.05 2.39 1.20 2.16 Africa No Full Low
SGP Singapore 6.79 0.36 East Asia Full No High Outlier
SVK Slovak Republic 0.40 0.00 0.01 0.26 No No Upper middle
SVN Slovenia 0.15 No Full
ZAF South Africa 1.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 Africa Full No Upper middle
LKA Sri Lanka 2.27 3.40 0.50 0.44 0.98 No Full Lower middle
SWZ Swaziland 5.26 0.13 0.36 1.34 Africa Full No Lower middle
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 2.68 4.28 0.04 0.30 5.70 Full Full Lower middle
TZA Tanzania 0.58 6.10 1.13 0.65 0.53 Africa Full Full Low
THA Thailand 4.60 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.23 East Asia No Full Lower middle
TGO Togo -0.07 4.15 1.45 0.45 1.45 Africa Full No Low
TTO Trinidad & Tobago 2.35 0.51 0.00 0.01 0.13 No Full Upper middle
TUN Tunisia 3.14 2.70 0.11 0.14 0.81 Full No Lower middle
TUR Turkey 2.33 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.34 No No Upper middle
UGA Uganda 1.29 6.15 1.67 0.40 0.99 Africa Full No Low
UKR Ukraine 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.11 No Full Lower middle
URY Uruguay 1.23 0.56 0.00 0.03 0.16 Full No Upper middle
VEN Venezuela, RB -0.50 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.03 Full No Upper middle
YEM Yemen, Rep. 1.50 0.54 0.34 0.54 No Full Low
ZMB Zambia -0.76 11.88 2.51 0.50 1.44 Africa Full Full Low
ZWE Zimbabwe 1.76 2.79 0.39 0.09 0.64 Africa Full Full Low    24 
Appendix IV. Data source  
Variable   Description  source 
aid_y  standard deviation of Aid (share of GDP)  WDI 
abs  absorption (change in the non-aid current account 
deficit as a share of the change in aid inflows)  authors' calculation 
spnd  spending (the widening in the government fiscal deficit 
net of aid)  authors' calculation 
ry_g  growth rate of GDP per capita (US$ 2000)  WDI 
k   gross capital formation (% of GDP)  WDI 
ki  investment (% of GDP)  WDI 
     
icrg 
ICRG ratings to capture institutional quality  
Authors’ calculation based on 
ICRG ratings 
yc_penn  Initial period GDP per capita (in PPP terms)   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
le_wdi  initial period life expectancy at birth  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
gadp6099  institutional quality  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
geog6099  geography  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
cg_i  initial period government consumption as share of 
GDP  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
tot_av  average growth of terms of trade  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
tot_stdev  standard deviation of terms of trade growth  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
sw1  trade policy  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
safrica  Sub-Sahara Africa dummy  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
east  east Asia Pacific  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
 
 